I investigate the impact of environmental volatility and the cost of information on the preferred organizational structure, as determined by the allocation of decision rights, the compensation structure of the managers and the degree of operational integration, such as the use of shared distribution and marketing channels across the operating divisions. The results are broadly consistent with the common wisdom regarding the …t between organizational design and the environment, with stable environments generally populated by tightly integrated and centralized organizations and volatile environments populated by loosely integrated and decentralized organizations. The relationship between decentralization and volatility is, however, re…ned in two ways. First, the equilibrium relationship between decentralization and volatility can be non-monotone, with decentralization arising as the preferred governance structure in both highly stable and highly volatile environments. Second, even if decentralization and volatility are generally positively associated in equilibrium, simply decentralizing decision-making as a response to an increase in volatility will actually worsen organizational performance unless the other design parameters are also adjusted appropriately.
Introduction
The need for a …t among organization's strategy, structure and its operating environment has been extensively discussed by management and strategy scholars at least since Chandler's Strategy and Structure (1962) . Building on this literature, this paper analyzes how environmental volatility and the cost of information about the environment in ‡uence the preferred strategic orientation of the organization and the resulting choice of three organizational design parameters: the allocation of decision rights, the compensation structure of managers and the degree of operational integration, such as the use of shared distribution and marketing channels among the operating divisions.
The dimension of strategy that I analyze is the choice between (local) responsiveness and (global) e¢ ciency. 1 In short, a …rm can generate value both through customizing its products and their marketing to meet varying and changing local tastes (increasing customer value) and through large-scale manufacturing and standardization (reducing production costs). The resulting strategic challenge faced by all …rms is …nding the right balance between the two. As observed by Porter (1996:10) : "Simultaneous improvement of cost and di¤erentiation is possible only when a company begins far behind the productivity frontier or when the frontier shifts outward. At the frontier, where companies have achieved current best practice, the trade-o¤ between cost and di¤erentiation is very real indeed." I link the strategic orientation of the organization to its choice of operational integration. Choosing minimal operational integration is equivalent to maximizing the potential for local responsiveness because each unit is then free to adapt to changes in local conditions without concern for interactions with the rest of the organization while minimizing the potential for e¢ ciency because of the resulting duplication of assets and the lack of scale. By increasing the degree of operational integration, the organization is able to improve the (potential) e¢ ciency of its operations, but to realize these e¢ ciency gains, the behavior of the operating units needs to be increasingly coordinated, resulting in a loss of responsiveness. 2 For example, introducing a common sales unit for two products (an increase in operational integration) can reduce baseline operating costs but the performance of the sales unit will be decreasing in the diversity of demands made on its behavior. Given the choice of operational integration and thus the balance between responsiveness and e¢ ciency, how much of the potential value is actually realized depends, in turn, on the remaining two choice variables: the allocation of decision rights and the compensation structure. Because the degree of operational integration in ‡uences both the nature and severity of agency con ‡icts inside the organization, each level of operational integration is best managed through a particular allocation of decision rights and a choice of compensation structure. And because the allocation of decision rights and the choice of compensation structure in ‡uence the value actually realized at any given level of operational integration, all three need to be determined simultaneously as the optimal response to a given environment.
To examine the …t between the overall organizational design and the environment, I analyze how organizational design in ‡uences the organization's ability to solve problems of coordinated adaptation, where the organization …rst needs to generate information about the local conditions faced by its divisions, then transmit that information to the decisionmaker(s) and …nally use that information in choosing how the divisions will respond. The organization consists of two operating divisions headed by self-interested division managers and a pro…t-maximizing headquarters. The choice of operational integration then determines how much coordination is needed between the divisional responses, while the allocation of decision rights and the compensation structure of the division managers are used to manage information acquisition, communication and decision-making conditional on the degree of operational integration. With respect to decision-making, I focus on the choice between decentralization (decision-making authority delegated to the division managers) and centralization (decision-making authority retained by the headquarters). With respect to the incentive structure, I analyze both the strength of incentives, as determined by the overall sensitivity of managerial compensation to performance, and the composition of incentives, as determined by the relative weight placed on division-and …rm-level performance in the compensation contract.
The results are broadly consistent with the common wisdom regarding the …t between strategy, structure and the environment. 3 First, given the allocation of decision rights, the be exempli…ed by the highly autonomous operating units of Philips, while the strategy of global e¢ ciency used to be exempli…ed by the highly centralized operations of Matsushita (now Panasonic). (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989 ) 3 For classic contributions, see, for example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) , Galbraith (1973 Galbraith ( ,1977 and Minzberg (1979) . In the context of MNCs, see, for example, Prahalad and Doz (1987) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) . For recent contributions, see, for example, Brickley et al (2003) and Roberts (2004) . equilibrium degree of operational integration is decreasing in the volatility of the environment. Intuitively, an increase in volatility increases the value of local responsiveness, which the organization achieves by reducing the degree of operational integration. Second, loosely integrated organizations are best managed through a decentralized decision-making structure and, because of the limited need for coordination, managerial compensation is primarily based on divisional performance to motivate information acquisition. Third, centralized decision-making is preferred only when the equilibrium degree of operational integration is su¢ ciently high and, because of the higher need for coordination, more use is made of …rm-wide incentives. As a result, volatile environments are generally characterized by organizations that pursue a strategy of local responsiveness through the combination of loosely integrated operations, decentralized decision-making and strong divisional incentives, while stable environments are populated by …rms that pursue a strategy of global e¢ ciency through the combination of tightly integrated operations, centralized decision-making and the use of …rm-wide incentives.
The results also re…ne and qualify some of these broad themes. In particular, while decentralization is always preferred for low levels of operational integration, it can also be preferred for any level of operational integration, as long as information acquisition is su¢ ciently cheap. Further, the relative advantage of centralization is largest at intermediate levels of operational integration. As a result, it is possible that the preferred structure for a very stable environment is a tightly integrated but decentralized organization, and that an increase in volatility, while leading to a reduction in operational integration, also leads to centralization of decision-making.
Finally, the results shed additional light on the relationship between decentralization and volatility. It is commonly argued that decentralized decision-making is preferred in more volatile environments and there exists some empirical evidence for a positive relationship between decentralization and volatility. 4 In the present model, while decentralization and volatility are generally positively associated in equilibrium, volatility is not directly causing decentralization. Instead, an increase in volatility causes a reduction in operational integration, which in turn increases the preference for decentralization. As a result, the positive association between volatility and decentralization arises only as a part of the overall adjustment in organizational design in response to a change in the environment. Simply decentralizing decision-making as a response to an increase in volatility would actually worsen organizational performance, unless the other design parameters are also adjusted appropriately. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related lit- 4 Discussed in section 6. erature and section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 derives the equilibrium pro…tability as a function of the environment and the design parameters. Section 5 analyzes the choice of the design parameters and the link between the organization and the environment. Section 6 summarizes the main insights and empirical implications and section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The model builds directly on the framework developed in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008a) . However, instead of focusing on the role that the allocation of decision rights plays in managing communication and decision-making in organizations, I focus on the interactions among di¤erent organizational design parameters and their joint …t with the environment. Because of this integrative nature of the framework, the analysis of the present paper is related to a number of di¤erent literatures. A number of papers examine complementarities among di¤erent subsets of organizational design parameters. Roberts (1990,1995) examine complementarities among different features of modern production technologies but pay only limited attention to the organizational structure used to govern that production. Holmström and Milgrom (1991,1994) analyze the provision of incentives for multiple tasks and extend those results to account for interactions among the level of incentives, asset ownership and job restrictions. 5 However, their primary focus is on examining the management of the behavior of a single agent operating a …xed technology and they don't explicitly analyze the role of decision-making and communication. This paper builds on both strands, by accounting for the interdependence between the choice of operating technology and the choice of organizational structure that is used to manage that technology. The papers most closely related to mine both in approach and content are Friebel and Raith (2007), Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2007) and Athey and Roberts (2001) , each of which looks at the simultaneous determination of incentives and decision-making authority from alternative angles. Friebel and Raith (2007) analyze a resource allocation problem, where divisional managers need to be motivated to exert e¤ort to generate high-quality projects and then to communicate that information (truthfully) to the headquarters. Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2007) analyze a synergy implementation problem, where again the managers need to be motivated to provide productive e¤ort but have also private information regarding the costs and bene…ts of implementing synergies. In both papers, the basic tradeo¤ is between providing strong incentives to induce e¤ort and to provide aligned incentives 5 See also Holmstrom (1999) to induce truthful communication. Finally, Athey and Roberts (2001) combine the problem of inducing productive e¤ort with a project selection problem. If one of the agents is allowed to make decisions, then he faces a multi-tasking problem analogous to the other papers, where the basic tension is between providing strong incentives to induce e¤ort and providing aligned incentives to induce good project implementation decisions. Introducing a third agent as the decision-maker helps to solve this multi-tasking problem.
The incentive provision problem in my setting also faces the basic tension between strong incentives to motivate information acquisition and balanced incentives to motivate accurate transmission and use of that information. However, by examining a di¤erent problem, some of the insights and results di¤er. The strategic nature of communication limits the value of an uninformed principal relative to Athey and Roberts (2001) . By looking at moral hazard in information acquisition instead of an e¤ort provision problem that is unrelated to decisionmaking, I can analyze links among the value of information, the value of incentive alignment and the allocation of decision rights, an issue that doesn't arise in Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2007) . Finally, even if some of these links are present in Friebel and Raith (2007) , the frameworks are qualitatively di¤erent and yield di¤erent predictions. For example, in their model, decentralization is always associated with zero incentive alignment because if interim reallocation of resources is desired, the headquarters is always in a better position to do so. In contrast, in my model, decentralization can exhibit both more or less incentive alignment than a corresponding centralized structure and the equilibrium degree of incentive alignment under the two governance structures is one of the key determinants behind the choice between the two.
The role of authority and delegation in managing agency problems is also examined in a number of other papers. Building on the cheap talk literature that has followed Crawford and Sobel (1982) , Dessein (2002) , Alonso (2007) and Raviv (2005,2007) examine how the allocation of decision rights can be used to manage the trade-o¤ between biased decisions and information losses due to strategic communication. 6 Aghion and Tirole (1997) illustrate how delegation can be used as a motivational tool by allowing the agent to freely use the information he learns. My framework embeds both aspects of the problem and joins them with the possibility of using monetary incentives, which allows us to examine the links between delegation and incentives. Rantakari (2008b) examines the impact of noisy performance measurement on the choice to delegate and Zabojnik (2002) examines the motivational impact that delegation has on the implementation e¤ort by the agent. Organizational structures have also been analyzed from various other angles. The paper closest to mine is Dessein and Santos (2006) , who examine a team-theoretic model that focuses on the limitations that the need for coordinated adaptation imposes on task specialization. Coordination in their model is, however, constrained only because information transmission is exogenously imperfect. Some other perspectives include information processing (for example, Marshak and Radner, 1972, Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994) , problem-solving (for example, Garicano, 2000) , screening for interdependencies (Harris and Raviv, 2002 ) and coordination and experimentation (Qian, Ronald and Xu, 2006) .
Finally, while the economic literature on organizational design is still relatively young, there is a long history of management and strategy scholars that have analyzed the topic of this paper. As a result, this paper owes an intellectual debt to a long string of contributions that have shaped my thinking, including Simon (1947) , Chandler (1962 Chandler ( ,1977 , Woodward (1965) , Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) , Thompson (1967) , Galbraith (1973 Galbraith ( ,1977 , Mintzberg (1979) and Porter (1980) , among many others, in particular the later works of Prahalad and Doz (1987) , Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) , Nadler and Tushman (1997), Brickley et al (2003) and Roberts (2004) .
The Model
The organization analyzed consists of two divisions, each managed by a self-interested division manager (he), and headquarters (she), who aims to maximize the overall pro…tability of the organization. This section outlines the payo¤s, available actions and the timing of events in detail.
Divisional pro…ts and alternative governance structures: The organization consists of two (symmetric) divisions, i and j: The pro…tability of each division depends on both how well the activities of the division are aligned with local conditions and how well the divisions are coordinated with each other. Given the decisions d i and d j regarding the operations of divisions i and j, respectively, the ex post pro…t of division i is given by
where i U ; indexes the locally optimal decision for division i; with i and j independently distributed and > 0 measuring the volatility of local conditions. The alignment of the division with its local conditions is then measured by ( i d i )
2 ; while the alignment with the other division is measured by
The realized pro…ts of the organization are given by i + j :
The …rst choice variable for the organization is the degree of operational integration 2 [0; 1); which measures the extent to which the organization uses shared components, manufacturing facilities, distribution networks, sales forces and the like across the divisions. The bene…ts of operational integration come from the potential reduction in operating costs that results form the elimination of duplicated assets and the increased scale of remaining operations, and are captured by an increasing and continuous function K ( ) : However, to fully realize these bene…ts, the behavior of the divisions needs to be increasingly coordinated. For example, the e¢ ciency of a common sales force is compromised if con ‡icting demands are placed on it by the two divisions, introducing just-in-time manufacturing and inventory management relies on smooth functioning of the supply chain and the value of standardized production facilities is reduced if the products manufactured require con ‡icting customization. This induced value of coordination is captured by
To summarize, the argument is two-fold. First, the degree of operational integration, which essentially re ‡ects the underlying con…guration of productive assets, is a choice variable.
7 Second, when choosing its level of operational integration, the organization faces the following trade-o¤: an increase in operational integration increases the potential e¢ ciency of operations, but to realize these bene…ts, the two divisions need to be increasingly coordinated with each other, which in turn reduces the ‡exibility of the divisions in responding to local conditions. The second choice variable for the organization is the allocation of authority over the divisions, captured by the right to make the decisions d i and d j . I consider two alternative arrangements. Under centralization, the headquarters retains control of both decisions, while under decentralization, control over the divisions is delegated to their respective division managers. I will use superscript g 2 fcent; decg to denote the two governance structures. 7 As observed by Porter (1990:17) :"A …rm faces an array of options in both con…guration and coordination for each activity. Con…guration options range from concentrated (performing an activity in one location and serving the world from it -e.g., one R&D lab, one large plant) to dispersed (performing each activity in each country). In the latter case, each country would have a complete value chain. Coordination options range from none to very high. For example, if a …rm produces its product in three plants, it could, at one extreme, allow each plant to operate with full autonomy -e.g., di¤erent product standards and features, di¤erent steps in the production process, di¤erent raw materials, di¤erent part numbers. At the other extreme, the plants could be tightly coordinated by employing the same information systems, the same production processes, the same parts, and so forth." 8 For brevity, we will only analyze symmetric divisions. Because of the assumed symmetry, asymmetric governance structures do not arise as equilibrium governance structures. For asymmetric divisions, the qualitative logic of Rantakari (2008a) regarding the relevant tradeo¤s continues to hold. Results are available from the author on request. 9 We thus assume that delegation is credible, an aspect which can be supported through both resource allocation and legal standing. For example, in the context of MNCs, there are several examples where the national subsidiaries have utilized both their direct control over national resources and their separate legal incorporation to explicitly disobey the instructions of the parent organization. One of the more ‡agrant Division managers: Each division is headed by a self-interested and risk-neutral division manager (managers i and j, respectively). Their behavior is managed through the third choice variable, which is their compensation structure. I assume that manager i is o¤ered a linear incentive contract
where (s ii ; s ij ) are the weights placed on the pro…tability of the two divisions. We can normalize this contract by rewriting it as
where = s ii + s ij measures the strength of incentives and s 2 ; 1 measures the degree of incentive alignment. 10 To relate this formulation to the composition of incentives, note that this contract is identical to a contract that would place a relative weight 2 (1 s) on …rm-wide performance i + j and a relative weight 2s 1 on divisional performance i ; for an overall pay-for-performance sensitivity : The closer s is to 1=2; the more weight is placed on …rm-wide performance and the more aligned the interests of the divisional managers.
Timing of events:
The organizational design parameters (g; ; s; ) are used to manage the unfolding of events summarized in …gure 1. First, the division managers invest in acquiring information about the local conditions faced by their divisions. In particular, manager i acquires a signal t i of the realized state i that is correct with probability q i and a random draw from U ; with probability 1 q i at a personal cost of C ; q i . The manager does not learn whether the signal is correct or not, so that upon observing a signal t i his posterior expectation about the local state is given by E i ( i jt i ) = q i t i :
11 Forecasting the results, the value of accuracy in terms of expected pro…ts will be linear in q 2 i : As a result, I de…ne p i = q 2 i and will refer to p i as the quality of primary information.
cases of disobedience was the refusal by Philips North America to adapt the internally developed V2000 videocassette standard, and instead decided to sell a VHS product supplied by Matsushita, the archrival of Philips. 10 A symmetric contract turns out to be optimal because of the assumed symmetry of the divisions, so assuming symmetry of compensation contracts from the beginning is without loss of generality. 11 We use this particular acquisition technology for two reasons. First, for purely technical reasons, the smooth posterior facilitates the analysis. Second, for descriptive purposes, having a belief over the reliability of information appears for many settings more plausible than knowing whether a piece of information is correct or not. I assume that the cost of information is given by
where parameterizes the (marginal) cost of information and 2 =3 is the ex ante variance of local conditions. The particular functional form simpli…es the solution to the information acquisition problem, with the associated marginal cost of primary information being given by
12 As a normalization, I assume that the marginal cost of information is proportional to the volatility of the environment. This assumption helps to provide a benchmark solution for the information acquisition problem and to separate the e¤ects of volatility and cost of information ( ) on the organizational design. Given the acquisition technology, the division managers choose p i to maximize their expected payo¤, E T i g i ; g j C ; p i : I assume that p i is observable but not veri…able to the organizational participants. 13 Having acquired their private information, the division managers strategically communicate their information to the decision-maker(s), where communication is modeled as one round of simultaneous cheap talk. In the case of centralization, 12 As discussed in an earlier version of the paper, the logic of the results is not dependent on the assumed cost function and generalize to any well-behaved cost function C ; p i with, for > 0; C pi ; p i 0, The organizational design problem and the cost of incentives: In the beginning of the game, the headquarters chooses the organizational design parameters to maximize her payo¤. As a …nal observation, note that for the problem to be interesting and for the governance structure to matter, it needs to be that incentive provision is costly to the headquarters. This result follows because if the organization faced no cost of providing incentives, then the optimal solution would be to set = 2 and s = 1=2; which would duplicate the full pro…t margin for both divisional managers and thus achieve the pro…t-maximizing solution.
To simplify the analysis, I take a reduced-form approach to modeling this cost of incentives and simply assume that the headquarters faces a cost 2 3 G ( ) of providing an incentive contract of strength ; with G ( ) ; G ( ) 0; while being agnostic as to the particular source of this cost. The scaling of the cost function with volatility turns out to be a convenient normalization for isolating the various interactions that are present in the model. 14 Finally, given the cost of incentives, we can write the design problem as the headquarters choosing the governance structure g; the compensation structure (s; ) and the degree of operational integration to max g; ;s;
Expected Pro…tability and Organizational Design
The …rst step in the analysis is to derive the expression for the expected pro…ts conditional on the design parameters (g; ; s; ) : The solution follows through backward-induction. I begin by discussing the equilibrium decisions (section 4.1), followed by the communication equilibrium (4.2) and the resulting expected pro…tability of the divisions conditional on the quality of primary information (4.3). These three steps are identical to Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008a) , with the exception of introducing imperfect primary information. I revisit these results here because the insights underlying their determination play a key role in understanding the rest of the solution, as the decision-making and communication equilibria determine how good use is made of the information generated by the division managers. 15 Section 4.4 discusses how the value of information depends on organizational design and section 4.5 completes the expression for the expected pro…ts by analyzing the information acquisition problem. Section 5 analyzes the choice of the design parameters and the relationship between overall design and the environment.
Equilibrium decisions
In the decision-making stage, the decision-maker(s) use the information available to them to maximize their individual payo¤s, conditional on the accuracy q Centralization: The information available to the headquarters (P ) consists of the messages m i and m j sent by the division managers. She solves
solution to which is given by
; where
Conditional on the information available to the headquarters, these decisions are, by assumption, pro…t-maximizing. As the degree of operational integration increases, the increasing importance of coordination makes the decisions increasingly insensitive to information regarding the division's own local conditions while becoming increasingly accommodating to the needs of the other division. As ! 1; the decisions become perfectly coordinated with
15 The discussion is, however, by necessity very brief. The reader interested in further details is advised to read either of the mentioned papers.
Decentralization: The information available to manager i consists of his private signal t i and the messages exchanged in the communication stage. Given the compensation contract (s; ) ; he solves
and similarly for manager j: The equilibrium decisions are given by
where E i E j j = q dec j E (t j jm j ). As long as s > 1 s; the division managers place too much weight on the performance of their own division when making decisions. I will refer to this suboptimal use of available information as the quality of decision-making, taking both the accuracy of the signals and the accuracy of their transmission as given. The key feature of the solution, which later plays an important role in understanding the choice of governance structure, is that the payo¤ consequences of this bias are non-monotone in the degree of operational integration. In particular, despite the potential own-division bias of division managers, the equilibrium decisions converge to the pro…t-maximizing decisions both when ! 0 and when ! 1: In the …rst case, the divisions are fully independent and, as a result, no coordination is needed between the divisions. In the second case, since the divisional payo¤s are fully dependent on coordination, the managers are willing to coordinate their behavior even absent any …rm-wide incentives. However, whenever some interdivisional con ‡ict is present and is interior, the own-division bias leads the managers to choose decisions that exhibit too much adaptation (and too little coordination), with the bias being largest when the relative importance of coordination =( + ) is intermediate, or when the tension between adaptation and coordination is the largest. Finally, the impact of incentive alignment is immediate: the quality of decision-making is monotonically improving in the relative weight placed on …rm-wide performance and converges to pro…t-maximizing when only …rm-level incentives are used.
Equilibrium communication
The communication stage is modeled as a cheap-talk game between the privately informed division managers and the decision-maker(s). Knowing how the equilibrium decisions depend on the beliefs of the decision-maker(s), the division managers send simultaneously nonveri…able messages regarding their local information in an attempt to induce more favorable decisions. 16 Of course, in equilibrium, such attempts to mislead the decision-maker(s) are futile and only lead to garbling of information. As a result, the equilibrium characterized by a partition structure, where the division managers are able to reveal only that their signal lies within a certain interval of the state space. A natural measure of the accuracy of information transmission is the expected variance of the beliefs of the recipient over t i conditional on the received message
We can characterize this variance (and so the coarseness of the most informative partition) through a single coe¢ cient ' g i (s; ) ; which depends on the particular governance structure g; the degree of incentive alignment s and the degree of operational integration : I will refer to ' g i (s; ) 2 (0; 1) as the quality of communication (given the accuracy of the managers' private signals t i and t j ). We can then write the conditional variance as
; where V ('
As ' If = 0; then the equilibrium is fully informative. In this case, the headquarters makes decisions that are fully responsive to local information without any concern for coordination, thus replicating the preferences of the division managers. However, whenever > 0 and s > 1=2; the own-division bias of the division managers leads them to prefer decisions that are more adapted to local conditions than what the headquarters will actually implement. This vertical con ‡ict is increasing in the degree of operational integration (for a given s) and, as a result, the quality of vertical communication is monotonically decreasing in ; while improving in degree of incentive alignment and becoming perfect when s ! 1=2 for all .
Decentralization: In the case of decentralization, communication is between the division managers (horizontal). The quality of communication is given by
16 Simultaneous communication is preferred over sequential communication.
The key di¤erence in the communication stage between centralization and decentralization is that in the case of decentralization, the division manager is in control of the operations of his division. As a result, instead of needing to persuade the headquarters about the needs of his division, he is only trying to persuade the other division manager to be more accommodating to what he plans to do. This di¤erence in the motives for communication is re ‡ected in the quality of communication. Now, when is low; this horizontal communication is at its worst because each division manager is simply doing what is individually optimal for him, largely disregarding any messages sent. As increases, this increase in the value of coordination increases the responsiveness of the managers to each other's behavior, thus reducing the horizontal con ‡ict. As a result, the quality of horizontal communication is monotonically increasing in : The impact of incentive alignment is naturally the same as under centralization.
Finally, note that so far we have only characterized the accuracy of information transmission and not its value. Intuitively, the value of accurate transmission will depend on both the governance structure and the degree of operational integration. In the case of centralization, communication is needed for the headquarters to be able to adapt her decisions to local conditions. As a result, the value of accurate communication will be highest for low levels of operational integration, when the decisions will be most responsive to that information. In the case of decentralization, the division managers already have access to local information but communication is needed to coordinate the responses. As a result, the value of accurate communication will be highest for high levels of operational integration.
The key aspect of the communication solution is that the net e¤ect of the value and endogenous accuracy of information transmission is such that for any given s > ; the value-weighted loss of information is almost always increasing in the degree of operational integration under both governance structures. 17 Thus, while the loss in value due to strategic decision-making under decentralization was non-monotone in ; the loss due to strategic communication is generally increasing in under both governance structures: The next subsection analyzes in more detail how these distortions impact the value of information and so organizational performance.
Expected pro…ts
Having derived the equilibrium decisions d ; and for now assuming that the quality of primary information generated by the structure (g; ; s; ) is given by p g i ; p g j ; we can write the expected pro…ts for the divisions as
The expected pro…tability of the divisions can thus be seen as being determined by three components. The …rst component, K ( )
; gives the expected pro…t conditional on a given degree of operational integration and no local information (p g i (s; ; ) = p g j (s; ; ) = 0), while the other two components measure the impact on divisional pro…ts caused by informative local signals t i and t j .
The second component,
; measures the increase in the pro…ts of division i that results from given accuracy of t i : First, divisional pro…ts are naturally increasing in the quality of primary information p g i because improvements in the quality of information allow the organization to adapt more accurately to local conditions. Second, divisional pro…ts depend on how that information actually gets used. This e¤ect is captured by the remainder of the component, which re ‡ects the value of a given quality of primary information. This value depends on three components. First, if the decisions were free to adapt to the information generated ( = 0), then the value of information is simply (value of adaptation). When the degree of operational integration is positive ( > 0), this value of information is reduced for two reasons. First, even conditional on perfect transmission of information, the decisions are no longer independent and instead need to balance adaptation and coordination. This reduction in adaptation and the associated reduction in the value of information is captured by g i (s; ) : Second, strategic communication reduces the quality of information reaching the decision-maker(s). As discussed in section 4.2, this loss depends on both how valuable information is to the decision-maker ( g ii (s; )) and how much information is actually lost due to strategic communication (V (' g i (s; ))). To simplify the notation, let
) denote the reduction in the value of information to division i relative to zero operational integration. We can then write the (marginal) value of information regarding i to division i as g i (s; ) > 0: Finally, the third component re ‡ects the payo¤ consequences of information acquisition by the other division. This impact also depends on how much information is acquired, how that information is used by the decision-maker(s) and how much value is lost due to strategic communication. A key feature of the solution is that while information improves the profitability of the division doing the acquisition (above), it also weakly reduces the pro…tability of the other division. Intuitively, the more accurate information a division generates, the more adaptive it will be. When the degree of operational integration is positive, this increase in adaptiveness requires increasing accommodation by the other division, which happens at the expense of its own adaptiveness. Let and, utilizing the symmetry between the divisions, we can reduce the expression for expected pro…tability to
This expression captures the basic logic underlying the solution. Given its degree of operational integration, the organization is able to improve its performance by either inducing more information acquisition or by using the existing information better. Because incentive provision is costly, the organization prefers a structure that is (i) able to generate more information or (ii) make better use of a given amount of information at a given level of incentives. Building the intuition for the equilibrium choices of (g; ; s; ) ; the next steps are then analyzing the dependency of g i (s; ) on organizational design and the managerial information acquisition problem, which endogenizes p g i ; s; ; :
Value of information and (g; s; )
Because the use (and so the value) of information, g i (s; ) ; is dependent on (s; ) and the governance structures di¤er in their use of information for given (s; ) ; understanding these di¤erences plays an important role in understanding the equilibrium choices of (g; ; s; ) : This dependency is illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots the value of information for both centralization and decentralization as a function of (s; ), together with the di¤erence between the two. 
β/(α+β) The value of information is monotonically decreasing in under both governance structures. When s = 1=2 (so that there is no agency problem in the use and transmission of information), this reduction in value results from the simple fact that as the degree of operational integration increases, the pro…t-maximizing decisions become less adaptive. For s > 1=2; the value of information is further reduced because of the loss of information due to strategic communication and, in the case of decentralization, biased decision-making. Because the quality of both decision-making (under decentralization) and communication (under both governance structures) is decreasing in the degree of interdivisional con ‡ict, the value of information is monotonically decreasing in s:
Panel (iii), in turn, illustrates which governance structure makes relatively better use of the existing information for a given choice of (s; ), a result which is key to understanding the equilibrium choice of governance structure. 19 We see that centralization makes better use of existing information if and only if the degree of incentive alignment is su¢ ciently high and the degree of incentive alignment is su¢ ciently low. This result follows from the di¤erential impact that ( ; s) have on the quality of decision-making and communication and the di¤erential dependency of the governance structures on the two, with centralization being more heavily dependent on the accuracy of communication. With respect to the degree of incentive alignment, the key result is that the quality of decision-making is improving at a faster rate in the degree of incentive alignment than the quality of communication is. As a result, as the degree of incentive alignment is increased, the remaining agency losses are increasingly due to strategic communication, making decentralization (which is less dependent on accurate communication) increasingly attractive.
To understand the impact of the degree of operational integration, recall that (i) the
Managerial information acquisition
The …nal step of the game is to solve for the equilibrium level of information acquisition. Using the notation from above, de…ne 
:
We can make the following observations regarding the quality of primary information acquired:
Proposition Part (i) of the proposition illustrates the properties shared by both governance structures. First, the quality of information acquired is naturally increasing in the strength of incentives. Second, the quality of information is decreasing in the degree of operational integration because increasing reduces the value of information. Third, the quality of information is increasing in the degree of incentive con ‡ict between the divisions. This result follows because increasing s leads the manager to put more weight on the (positive) value realized by his division while placing less weight on the negative externality imposed on the other division. 20 Thus, while the true value of information is decreasing in s, the perceived value of information is increasing in s: This result makes it possible to motivate information acquisition both through the strength of incentives and through the degree of con ‡ict between the division managers. Finally, the quality of information is naturally decreasing in the cost of information. Note that because I have assumed that the marginal cost of information is proportional to environmental volatility, the quality of information acquired is independent of the level of volatility and so provides a clean benchmark for the analysis.
Having understood this case, it is then straightforward to consider the additional impact that di¤erences in and potential covariation of and have on the preferred design. Part (ii) of the proposition summarizes the di¤erence in the quality of information acquired under the two governance structures. It states that, for a given ( ; s; ), the quality of primary information acquired is higher under decentralization unless both the degree of operational integration and the degree of incentive con ‡ict between the division managers are su¢ ciently high, in which case the opposite holds. This result re ‡ects the di¤erence in the perceived value of information under the two governance structures, which is determined by the di¤erence in the true value of information (discussed above) and the di¤erence in the size of the negative externality. This negative informational externality turns out to be always higher under decentralization, re ‡ecting the size of the own-division bias in the equilibrium decisions. As a result, the quality of primary information acquired under given ( ; s; ) is almost always higher under decentralization.
Choice of Organizational Design
Having endogenized the equilibrium decisions, communication and information acquisition, we can now move on to the organizational design problem. Substituting the missing components into the net surplus function and utilizing the symmetry between the divisions, we can write the design problem as 5.1 Choice of (s g ; g ; g ) and g
Conditional on the governance structure, the choice of the other design parameters satisfy the following three …rst-order conditions:
Consider …rst the choice of incentive strength ( g ). The only role of incentive strength is to motivate additional information acquisition, and the choice simply equates the marginal bene…t of incentives in terms of the increase in and marginal value of the information generated with the marginal cost of incentives. Changes in the degree of incentive alignment (s g ) have two e¤ects. On the one hand, increasing the degree of incentive alignment improves the use of existing information and thus the true value of information (@ g i (s; ) =@s < 0). On the other hand, increasing the degree of incentive alignment reduces the quality of primary information (@p g i (:) =@s > 0). The equilibrium degree of incentive alignment balances these two e¤ects. A result that will later play a role in the comparative statics is the observation that 21 Both s g and g can also attain corner solutions, with s g 2 f1=2; 1g and g 2 f0; 1g : the higher the equilibrium quality of information, the more valuable incentive alignment is. Intuitively, the more information the organization generates, the more attractive it is to use that information accurately. Finally, the bene…t of operational integration comes from the increase in the maximal e¢ ciency of the organization (K 0 ( ) > 0), while the cost comes from two sources. First, the responsiveness of the organization is reduced (@ g i (s; ) =@ < 0). Second, operational integration reduces the quality of information acquired by the division manager (@p g i (:) =@ < 0). While the basic trade-o¤s are thus relatively simple, the choice of each parameter depends also on the choice of all the other parameters. This richness of interactions makes it impossible to derive fully unambiguous results regarding their co-movement. However, to build some intuition for the results to follow, we can make some observations regarding these interactions. First, the strength of incentives and the degree of incentive alignment are generally pairwise complements. An increase in incentive alignment reduces the perceived value of information (thus decreasing the quality of information acquired by the manager) while increasing the true value of information (by improving its usage), thus making motivating additional information acquisition more valuable. Second, the strength of incentives and the degree of operational integration are generally pairwise substitutes because an increase in the degree of operational integration reduces the true value of information and thus the value of information acquisition. Third, the degree of incentive alignment and the degree of operational integration are generally pairwise complements. An increase in the degree of operational integration reduces the true value of information while generally increasing the con ‡ict between the division managers, with both e¤ects increasing the value of incentive alignment. 22 Finally, having determined (s g ; g ; g ) and the resulting expected pro…t under the two governance structures, the organization chooses its preferred governance structure. This choice is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Choice of governance structure: Centralization is preferred over decentralization if and only if the equilibrium degree of operational integration is su¢ ciently high and the equilibrium degree of incentive alignment is su¢ ciently low under both governance structures.
I have intentionally written the proposition in terms of endogenous variables to highlight 22 The …rst two relationships can be overturned because the discussed changes also alter the responsiveness of the manager to incentives, while the third relationship can be overturned because an increase in operational integration also reduces the quality of information acquired, which reduces the value of incentive alignment. These relationships are elaborated in more detail in Appendix A. that the logic of section 4.4 continues to hold even after the other design parameters have been endogenized, and that the choice of governance structure is not directly dependent on the environment, as characterized by ; C( ; p i ); K( ) and G ( ) : 23 However, because these variables in ‡uence the optimal choice of the other design parameters, they also indirectly impact the choice of governance structure. Stating the same proposition in terms of the environmental variables, we can observe that centralization is preferred when the bene…ts of operational integration, cost of information and/or the cost of incentives are su¢ ciently large relative to volatility. To build intuition for this result, consider …rst any con…guration that would lead to a su¢ ciently low degree of operational integration under both governance structures. Then, as shown in sections 4.4 and 4.5, decentralization is able to both generate more information and make better use of that information at a given strength of incentives, and because incentive provision is costly, strictly outperform centralization. Second, consider an environment that leads to a su¢ ciently high degree of operational integration under both governance structures. If either information or incentive provision is su¢ ciently costly, the equilibrium quality of information will be relatively poor and as a result, the equilibrium degree of incentive alignment will be low. And when incentive alignment is su¢ ciently low, centralization makes better use of the information generated (and can generate more information). Alternatively, if both information and incentive alignment are su¢ ciently cheap, then the organization generates a lot of information, the equilibrium degree of incentive alignment will be high, and decentralization again both generates more information and makes better use of that information.
Organizational design and the environment
Having outlined the choice of the design parameters for a given environment, we can now complete the analysis by examining the link between the overall organizational design and the environment. To illustrate the equilibrium results, I will solve the model numerically. The bene…ts of operational integration and the cost of incentives are given by ; where the bene…t function is chosen for its ‡exibility and the cost of incentives for its sim- 23 The proof follows from a replication argument presented in Appendix A. plicity. 24 The qualitative results are not a¤ected by the particular functional forms used. 25 Consider …rst the relationship between organizational design and volatility. Recall from the …rst-order conditions in section 5.1 that the choice of g is the only …rst-order condition that is directly dependent on environmental volatility. However, because of the interactions among the design parameters, changes in volatility will lead to rich changes in the overall design. This relationship is illustrated in …gure 3, with panel (i) showing the equilibrium degree of operational integration and panel (ii) showing the structure of compensation under the two governance structures, together with the preferred governance structure. 26 I will discuss each part separately.
Operational integration: The equilibrium degree of operational integration is monotonically decreasing in the volatility of the environment under both governance structures. In short, an increase in volatility increases the value of responsiveness, which the organization achieves by reducing its degree of operational integration. Because the degree of operational integration is the only variable that depends directly on the volatility of the environment, this result holds independent of the particular parameterization.
Compensation structure: Panel (ii) illustrates the typical behavior of the compensation structure under the two governance structures. Consider the basic forces that enter the determination of the compensation structure. A reduction in operational integration increases the value of information. To induce additional information acquisition, the organization can either increase the strength of incentives and/or reduce the degree of incentive alignment (section 4.5). The marginal cost of incentive strength is shared by the two governance structures and is proportional to volatility by assumption. However, the two governance structures di¤er signi…cantly in the marginal cost of incentive con ‡ict in terms of impacting how well the information generated gets used (sections 4.1-4.4).
Under centralization, the agency loss due to strategic communication is lower for lower levels of operational integration, so that the cost of incentive con ‡ict is lower. As a result, centralization optimally substitutes con ‡ict for the strength of incentives as the tool for motivating information acquisition and we observe increasing use of division-level incentives and decreasing use of …rm-level incentives as the degree of operational integration decreases 24 For brevity, I will not discuss the role of operational integration explicitly. In short, the optimal level of operational integration depends on both the maximal bene…ts of operational integration and how quickly these bene…ts are realized. The higher the maximal bene…ts, the higher the equilibrium level of integration while the quicker the bene…ts are realized (the more concave the function), the lower the equilibrium level of integration. 25 The particular parameterization used for the bene…t function is A = 4; 1 = 2:5; 2 = 3 = 0:5 and = 1:2: For the cost of incentives function, B = 0:01: 
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Under decentralization, the logic is similar. Recall, however, that under decentralization, the quality of decision-making worsens as we move from high to intermediate levels of operational integration (section 4.1), implying that the cost of incentive con ‡ict is initially increasing. As a result, a decentralized organization will initially reduce division-level incentives while increasing the strength of incentives as the means of motivating additional information acquisition, before it becomes more attractive to increase con ‡ict as the motivating tool. Further, because the quality of decision-making improves faster than the quality of communication in the degree of incentive alignment (section 4.4), decentralization generally bene…ts more from incentive alignment and thus makes heavier use of …rm-level incentives for any given level of operational integration. This di¤erence in the compensation structure is highest for intermediate levels of operational integration, where the di¤erence in the cost of incentive con ‡ict is the largest between the two governance structures.
Governance structure: As stated in proposition 2, decentralization is always preferred for su¢ ciently low levels of operational integration, which implies, because of the negative relationship between volatility and operational integration, that decentralization is preferred whenever the environment is su¢ ciently volatile. Similarly, in the example given in …gure 3, the equilibrium compensation structure is such that centralization is preferred whenever Figure 4: Cost of information, environmental volatility and the choice of governance structure the environment is su¢ ciently stable (and the associated degree of operational integration is su¢ ciently high). This monotone relationship between volatility and decentralization holds, however, only when the cost of primary information is su¢ ciently high. Figure 4 illustrates how the choice of governance structure depends on both cost of information and volatility and provides another cross-section of the relationship between volatility and organizational design analogous to …gure 3. 28 As illustrated in panel (iii), as information becomes cheaper, decentralization becomes …rst the preferred governance structure for both very stable and very volatile environments and, as the cost of information falls further, for all levels of volatility (and associated degrees of operational integration).
To understand the logic behind this result, consider the impact that a reduction in the cost of information has on the underlying trade-o¤s. Keeping the strength of incentives and the degree of operational integration constant, the division managers choose to acquire more information. This increase in the quality of primary information increases the value of incentive alignment and allows the organization to economize on incentive provision. 29 In essence, a reduction in the cost of information relaxes the fundamental trade-o¤ between motivating information acquisition and then motivating appropriate use of that information. While the performance of both governance structures is improved as a result, decentralization bene…ts more from the relaxation of this trade-o¤ and eventually catches up to (and outperforms) centralization. 30 This result follows again from the observation that the quality of decisionmaking is improving at a faster rate in the degree of incentive alignment than the quality of communication is. Centralization remains preferred the longest in the region where its initial advantage is the largest, which is in the region of intermediate operational integration.
Empirical predictions and practical implications
While the complexity of the interactions makes deriving unambiguous conclusions challenging, we can still make some empirical predictions, summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 3 Empirical predictions
(i) An increase in environmental volatility decreases the equilibrium degree of operational integration while an increase in the cost of information increases the equilibrium degree of operational integration (for a given governance structure).
(ii) Centralization arises as the preferred governance structure only for su¢ ciently high levels of operational integration and exhibits only limited use of …rm-wide incentives (conditional on the degree of operational integration).
(iii) Loosely coupled organizations are always decentralized and are often run as pure pro…t centers (no use of …rm-wide incentives).
(iv) For a given level of operational integration, a decentralized structure typically exhibits both stronger incentives and a higher degree of incentive alignment.
(v) The relationship between volatility and decentralization can be non-monotone.
tional integration. 30 Whenever centralization is initially preferred. Of course, for low levels of operational integration and for high levels of operational integration but a high degree of incentive alignment, centralization bene…ts relatively more from any additional degree of incentive alignment. But, because the remaining agency losses are due to strategic communication, it can never overtake decentralization. Performance is simply equated at the limit of perfect alignment.
Taken together, the results are both closely related and broadly consistent with the management and strategy literature that has examined the link between organizational design and the environment. First, the results highlight the general importance of …t among the organization's strategy, structure and its operating environment: for each environment, there is a unique strategic orientation and a related asset con…guration (as re ‡ected by the choice of operational integration) coupled with a unique organizational structure (as re ‡ected by the allocation of decision rights and the compensation structure of the managers) that maximizes organizational performance. In particular, the relationship between the environment and the overall organizational design is broadly consistent with the typology of multinational corporations (MNCs) developed in Prahalad and Doz (1987) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) . Environments that are very volatile (and where local responsiveness is thus very valuable) are populated by corporations that are loosely integrated, with divisions operated as pure (or near) pro…t centers and with the decision-making power delegated to the division managers. Similarly, stable environments are populated by corporations that are tightly integrated, with the compensation of the division managers at least partially tied to …rm-wide performance and with the decision-making power typically centralized. Finally, environments for which neither global e¢ ciency nor local responsiveness are the dominant concern, the organization attempts to …nd a delicate balance between the two, and depending on the balance, either centralize or decentralize decision-making.
Second, the presence of the various interdependencies suggests why many corporate restructurings have yielded disappointing results. A successful restructuring requires more than simply redrawing the organizational chart. Instead, it requires an internally consistent readjustment of all organizational design parameters together with the strategic orientation of the organization. For example, the attempt of Brown-Boveri to rationalize its production in the 1970s got thwarted by the failure to simultaneously adjust managerial compensation and authority structures: "Division managers in Germany and France were still measured and evaluated on their own short-term results and had little incentive to help their Italian colleagues. To the contrary, the di¢ culties in Italy gave the German managers an ability to turn around their business on their own and ignore the joint integration plan." (Prahalad and Doz, 1987/1999:206) .
Third, and closely related, the results shed new light on the much-discussed relationship between delegation and uncertainty. It is generally argued that an increase in uncertainty increases the preference for decentralization because of the increased importance of local information, a relationship that has found some empirical support (discussed below). This common argument is re…ned in two dimensions. First, as argued in section 5.2, an increase in uncertainty need not always increase the preference for decentralization, a result which arose through the ability of centralization to economize on incentive provision for intermediate levels of operational integration. Second, and potentially more importantly, even if volatility and the preference for decentralization are positively associated in equilibrium, volatility is not directly causing decentralization. Instead, decentralization arises only as a part of the overall adjustment in organizational design: An increase in volatility decreases the equilibrium degree of operational integration, and it is only because decentralization is a more e¢ cient structure for managing a loosely integrated organization that decision-making authority is delegated to the division managers. Thus, even if volatility and decentralization are positively associated in equilibrium, simply decentralizing decision-making in response to increased volatility would actually worsen organizational performance. Instead, all design parameters need to be adjusted together in an internally consistent fashion to maintain the …t between the organization and the environment.
Existing empirical evidence: While there is an increasing body of empirical work examining the relationship between the environment and di¤erent organizational variables, I am unaware of any work that would take a comprehensive view of the overall design problem, as suggested by the present results. However, as reviewed by Colombo and Delmasto (2008) , some results regarding the co-movements of di¤erent subsets of parameters are starting to emerge. First, there is now an increasing amount of evidence that …rms that operate in environments that exhibit more volatility and higher informational asymmetries are more decentralized and that decentralization is generally associated with pay that is more tied to …rm-level performance (Nagar 2002 and Wulf 2006 , for example). 31 Second, an increase in interdependencies across operating units is generally associated with a decrease in delegation of decision-making authority and an increase in the use of …rm-level performance measures (Bushman et . Both of these results are broadly consistent with the theoretical results presented above. However, as mentioned above, the overall …t between organizational design and the environment is yet to be systematically tested. In particular, interdependency of operations is typically treated as an exogenous variable, if included at all, and, with few exceptions, delegation and incentives are analyzed as separate variables, while the theoretical framework suggests that all three are determined simultaneously by the environment.
32 31 In a closely related paper, Guadalupe and Wulf (2008) show that an increase in product market competition has led …rms to eliminate management layers (related to decentralization) and increase both …rm-and division-level pay for division managers. 32 Of course, industries vary in the bene…ts of operational integration, but they still face a choice how integrated to be. For example, Philips used to be signi…cantly less integrated than Matsushita (now Panasonic) (Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989) and Hewlett-Packard used to be less integrated than IBM (Prahalad and Doz, 1987) , and changes in market conditions have led all four …rms to navigate towards an intermediate solution.
Some extensions
Variation in the cost of incentives: In the discussion of the results, no mention was made of di¤erences in the cost of incentives. The reason for this apparent neglect lies in the result that changes in the cost of incentives have an impact that is qualitatively equivalent to changes in the cost of information. To see this, recall that the primary trade-o¤ in the framework was between motivating the generation of information and then motivating appropriate use of that information. A reduction in the cost of information allows for more information generation at a given strength of incentives. A reduction in the cost of incentives allows for the provision of stronger incentives to generate information.
Measures of complexity:
Complexity of the environment is sometimes o¤ered, together with volatility, as another important dimension of the environment when analyzing the link between organizational design and the environment. Cost of information can be seen as one aspect of environmental complexity but I have not discussed it as such because there are other aspects to complexity that are not captured by cost of information and which can have a di¤erential impact on the organizational design. As an example, another dimension of complexity is the di¢ culty of transmitting information. First, the recipient of the messages can misunderstand the content of the messages, where the likelihood of misunderstandings is increasing in the complexity of the task at hand. Second, information can be veri…able but only at a cost, and the cost of veri…ability is increasing in the complexity of the environment. Rantakari (2008c) discusses the impact of both dimensions on the relative performance of the two governance structures and shows that an increase in both the likelihood of misunderstandings and the cost of veri…cation decrease the attractiveness of centralization. In other words, the impact on the optimal governance structure is exactly opposite to that of cost of information. For comparative statics, it is then crucial whether a given measure re ‡ects the di¢ culty of generating information or the transmission of that information.
Conclusion
I have examined the …t between the overall organizational design, composed of the degree of operational integration, allocation of decision rights and the compensation structure of division managers, and the environment, as determined by its volatility and the cost of information. The results were broadly consistent with the accepted wisdom regarding the …t between the organizational design and the environment. Volatile environments were characterized by organizations that were loosely integrated, with decentralized decision-making and the compensation of division managers based primarily on divisional performance, while stable environments were characterized by organizations that were tightly integrated, with decision-making generally centralized and compensation structure that made more extensive use of …rm-wide incentives.
While the results were broadly consistent with the accepted wisdom and highlighted the importance of …t not only between the design and the environment but also among the di¤erent design parameters, they also re…ned the common intuition in two dimensions. First, the results showed that the equilibrium likelihood of decentralization need not be monotonically increasing in the volatility of the environment. Second, even if decentralization and volatility were generally positively associated in equilibrium, volatility did not directly cause decentralization. Instead, an increase in volatility led to a reduction in operational integration, which in turn increased the preference for decentralization. As a consequence, despite the positive equilibrium association of decentralization and volatility in the present framework, simply decentralizing decision-making as a response to an increase in volatility would actually worsen organizational performance. Instead, to maintain the …t between the overall design and the environment, one needs to account for the interactions among the design parameters and adjust them together in an internally consistent fashion.
A Proofs and derivations

A.1 Expected pro…ts
The derivation of the expected pro…ts is detailed in Rantakari (2008a) , so I will only outline the impact that imperfect primary information has on the solution.
Decision-making: Let m and n denote the decision-makers controlling decisions i and j respectively. Let m 0 s objective function be of the form s mi i + s mj j : Then, we can write the …rst-order conditions for the two decisions as
so that the equilibrium decisions are given by (after repeated substitution)
where a 1 and a 2 (b 1 and b 2 ) are the relative weights placed on adaptation and coordination by m (n). Note that the equilibrium responsiveness of the agent to changes in beliefs is independent of the accuracy of beliefs, so that the only di¤erence to the full-information case is that all information is discounted by q i ; the accuracy of primary information.
Communication: Communication is modeled as one round of simultaneous cheap talk. The equilibrium takes a partition structure, where the cuto¤s of the partition are determined by the sender's indi¤erence condition
That is, given that the realized signal t M i falls on the boundary of two intervals of the partition, then the division manager needs to be indi¤erent between saying that the realized state belongs to the lower interval (m
. The solution is equivalent to the full information-case (t i = i ). The reason for this result follows from the fact that because both the sender and the receiver discount information at the rate q i ; the accuracy of information cancels out in determining the relative incentive con ‡ict between the sender and the receiver.
Expected pro…ts: Substituting the equilibrium decisions into the pro…t function, we can write the decision-dependent component (in loss terms) as
where k i = ( + ) and r i = = ( + ) ; with (a 1 ; a 2 ; b 1 ; b 2 ) as given by the …rst-order conditions for the equilibrium decisions. Because the communication equilibrium is unchanged as a result of inaccurate primary information, the …rst two lines are identical to the fullinformation case, with the exception that all components are scaled by p i = q 2 i : This result follows because the …rst two lines re ‡ect only the di¤erences in the posterior beliefs held by the sender and the receiver. The only component that depends directly on the quality of primary information is V ar m i : When m = i; so that manager i decides d i (decentralization), then
where x i is a random draw from ; . As a result,
When m = P (centralization), we have that
Now,
the headquarters' beliefs must be unbiased so that E (t i E m t i ) = 0: Above we already showed that
so we have that
with the …rst component re ‡ecting the inaccuracy of information transmission and the second component giving the additional loss due to inaccurate primary information, as in the case of decentralization. The expected pro…t can then be written as if information was perfect but distributed on U q i i ; q i i and a common extra component re ‡ecting the inaccuracy of primary information: ; we need to examine their impact on the perceived value of information. While taking the derivatives is analytically cumbersome, they are easily veri…ed numerically, which is done in …gure 5. 33 Intuitively, an increase in reduces the true value of information and, while it also typically increases the negative externality, the …rst e¤ect dominates. Similarly, while an increase in s reduces the true value of information, the division manager puts more weight on the value realized by his division and less on the negative externality, and the latter forces dominate, so that the perceived value of information is actually increasing in s:
The comparison of the quality of information acquired under the two governance structures follows directly from the di¤erence in perceived value of information, which is given in …gure 6. The …rst determinant of the perceived value of information is the true value of information, which is greater under centralization only when both and s are su¢ ciently large, as discussed in section 4.4. The second determinant is the size of the negative externality The net e¤ect is such that the perceived value of information and so the quality of information acquired is almost always higher under decentralization for given ( ; s; ), except when both and s are very large so that the externality converges to zero and the di¤erence in the true value of information dominates. Now, taking the …rst-order condition, say, with respect to ; we get
and noting further that since the division manager's information acquisition choice satis…es e g i (s; ) Now, to examine the interdependencies across the design parameters we examine simply the pairwise relationships because there is less ambiguity. We do this by analyzing the cross-partials of the pro…t function, but let us manipulate the …rst-order condition a little bit more to build up the intuition. which measures how far the quality of information acquired is from the pro…t-maximizing level (given ; s). This gap depends on two aspects. First, how large a margin the manager internalizes of the true value of information, as given by s; minus the incentives provided by the incentive con ‡ict (2s 1) through the negative externality. We will use g i (s; ) to denote this valuation gap.
Moving on to the pairwise dependencies, let us begin with incentive strength and alignment. We have that > 0: The impact that an increase in s has on the bene…ts of increasing is two-fold. First, an increase in s increases the amount of information acquired and thus reduces the valuation gap g i (s; ) ; which in turn reduces the value of the strength of incentives. Second, increasing the degree of incentive con ‡ict also alters the responsiveness of the agent to incentives, which is composed of two competing e¤ects. First, an increase in s increases the perceived value of information, making the agent more responsive to incentives. However, because this change induces further information acquisition, it moves the agent to a more convex part of his cost function and so reduces his responsiveness to incentives. (p g i 0:5); the coe¢ cient is negative and the partial derivative is unambiguously negative. For su¢ ciently small (relative to the cost of information so that p g i is low), the coe¢ cient can be positive and the strength of incentives and incentive alignment can be substitutes. Numerical examples suggest that this can occur but needs to be su¢ ciently low relative to the cost of information for this to occur.
Second, we will argue that @ 2 @ @ -0; so that the degree of operational integration and the strength of incentives are generally substitutes. Taking the cross-partial, we have
From earlier, we have that The only exception occurs under decentralization when both and s are su¢ ciently large so that an increase in actually improves decision-making and thus lowers dec j (s; ). But in this region, decentralization would never arise as the preferred governance structure (increasing operational integration further would actually reduce agency losses). Further, when is su¢ ciently small, the e¤ect on true value always dominates.
The e¤ect on the sensitivity of the manager is again ambiguous and from above, exactly the opposite to the degree of incentive con ‡ict, with the sign of
equal to the sign of e g i (s; ) (since @ e g i (s; ) @ < 0). Thus, the sign of the cross-partial is (almost) unambiguous when e g i (s; ) (so that p g i 0:5). Numerical estimations suggest that this sign remains negative under centralization while being positive under decentralization only in regions of high s; and ; where it is dominated by centralization (reasons for which were discussed with the choice of governance structure).
Finally, the relationship between operational integration and strength of incentives is characterized by
Let us begin by summarizing what we already know. From above,
-0 because of the reduced true value of information and increased externality. In other words, an increase in reduces the value of motivating information acquisition and thus supports a decrease in s (an increase in incentive alignment). Second, the resulting change in the perceived value of information alters the sensitivity of the agent to incentives to acquire information, as above, but now the expression is slightly more complex. Since
we have that
We know that < 0 less costly. This e¤ect works in the opposite direction, supporting lower strength of incentives. Finally, a change in directly alters how much the value of information is impacted by the degree of incentive con ‡ict, which in turn impacts the current value of information. For this e¤ect, we have that @ 2 g i (s; ) @s@ -0; as shown in …gure 7: In other words, an increase in operational integration makes the true value of information to deteriorate faster with increases in s because of increasing agency con ‡icts. Again, the exception occurs for decentralization when operational integration actually reduces the size of the agency con ‡ict, a region where centralization would be preferred.
For the overall e¤ect, numerical estimations suggest that the sign is always negative under centralization, while it can be positive under decentralization but again only when centralization would generally be preferred. Intuitively, this should be the case because the …rst-order e¤ect of increased operational integration is to decrease the value of information, increase the free incentives for information acquisition generated by the negative externality and increase the value of incentive alignment because of the increase in agency con ‡icts. However, it is also possible that for di¤erent cost functions, the drop in the quality of information acquired caused by an increase in is so large that the organization must actually increase s to restore incentives for information acquisition. 34 34 We can also bound the maximal e¤ect -note that for In section 4.4, we showed that decentralization makes better use of a given amount of primary information whenever the degree of operational integration is su¢ ciently low, independent of the amount of pro…t-sharing, and also whenever the degree of pro…t-sharing is su¢ ciently high, independent of the degree of operational integration. Now, let the particular (s; ) equal s cent ; cent , the optimal centralized solution for the particular environment and for now assume that and p i are the same across the governance structures. ; implying that the centralized (but suboptimal) structure both generates more information and makes better use of that information than an otherwise identical (and optimally chosen) decentralized structure, which completes the proof. In both directions, the performance of the preferred governance structure would be further enforced by re-optimizing
:
Of course, the exact location of the boundary in the (s; )-space depends on the di¤er-ences in the equilibrium quality of information and the strength of incentives that a¤ect the quantitative trade-o¤s involved ( integration never leads to a higher quality of primary information. However, this comparison holds only for a given governance structure because di¤erences in equilibrium s; across the governance structures.
B Cost of incentives
The analysis took a reduced-form approach to the cost of providing incentives. The simple justi…cation for this approach was that it is generally accepted that incentive provision is costly. Further, the general logic of the results is not dependent on the particular source of these costs, while complicating the interpretation of the results. The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, I will discuss some of the potential microfoundations for these costs. Second, I to illustrate the impact that variation in the cost of incentives can have on the relationship between volatility and environment, where I consider an alternative structure for the cost of incentives, assuming that instead of being proportional to uncertainty, it is independent of uncertainty.
Absence of a budget-breaker: The simplest possible reason for the inability of the organization to achieve the …rst-best outcome of = 2; s = 1=2 is the absence of a budget-breaker. The implication of this assumption is that while the organization is able to divide the existing pro…t stream among the active participants, it is unable to leverage that pro…t stream to provide the full margin to all participants, e¤ectively setting max = 1: The simple justi…cation for this assumption follows from the observation that the moment the pro…t stream is leveraged, the person responsible for the …nal payments has an incentive to sabotage the outcome and so avoid making the required payments. The shortcoming of this approach is that it arti…cially keeps the strength of incentives …xed at = 1; thus preventing us from analyzing the interaction between the strength and composition of incentives and how the strength of incentives can vary across organizational structures and environments.
Headquarters as a strategic actor: A simple "…x" to the above shortcoming is to assume, in addition to the absence of a budget breaker, that the headquarters also needs to be motivated to behave appropriately. In particular, one could assume that while information acquisition, by its local nature, must be undertaken by the division manager, the headquarters is able to engage in e¤ort provision that improves the pro…tability of the divisions. Then, given that the pro…t streams cannot be leveraged, any share of the pro…ts that is used to motivate the division managers is a share that cannot be used to motivate the headquarters. The cost of incentives is then equal to the reduction in pro…ts resulting from the reduction in the e¤ort level of the headquarters. For example, if the headquarters was able to improve pro…ts of division i by e i by exerting e¤ort e i at a personal cost To see this, note that if share i is used to motivate the division managers, (1 i ) is retained by the headquarters, leading to an e¤ort choice of e i = (1 i ) and a net surplus of 2 (1 i )(1+ i ) 2
; while the …rst-best e¤ort level ( i = 0) would produce a net surplus of
The di¤erence, which then matches the cost of incentives, is In this case, because the value of headquarters'e¤ort is independent of volatility, so is the cost of incentives. However, it would also be natural to assume that the value of e¤ort is increasing in volatility. For example, if the marginal value of e¤ort was ; then the cost of incentives would be proportional to 2 as assumed in the analysis. Further, depending on the shape of bene…t and cost functions, one could generate any shape of G ; :
Limited liability and ex ante budget constraints: Another commonly used source of incentive costs is the presence of limited liability, where the realized wage of the agent cannot fall below zero, combined with the presence of an ex ante budget constraint (or moral hazard on part of the principal), which makes it impossible for the agent to post a performance bond ex ante to relax this constraint. In this case, while the total net surplus would be maximized by setting = 2; s = 1=2; the principal is generally unwilling to do this because it would require leaving the agent with unnecessarily high rents. Instead, the principal distorts the contract and destroys some of the total net surplus while increasing her share of the surplus. Unfortunately, performing the analysis in detail under this set of assumptions is infeasible because it would lead to a non-linear compensation structure and thus destroy the tractability of both the decision-making and communication equilibria. Further, how stringent the constraint would be depends on the expected level of pro…ts, which are not pinned down by the model. What limited liability really boils down to, however, is simply that the principal cannot expropriate the full surplus and thus has incentives to set suboptimal incentives. 35 Suppose that the principal provides a share of pro…ts to incentivize the agents but is able to extract only (1 ( )) of that surplus in terms of ex ante transfers for one reason or another. Then, the objective function of the principal will be to maximize E ((1 ( ) ) ( i + j )) : The apparent di¤erence to the formulation used in the paper is that the "cost of incentives" is now structure-speci…c. This di¤erence is, however, only quantitative. First, note that it is only the strength of incentives that impacts the share of the surplus received by the principal. As a result, (g; s; ) are still chosen to maximize the total surplus conditional on the strength of incentives, : The only di¤erence is now that a structure that performs better faces a higher cost of incentives. The organization then optimally reduces the strength of incentives to economize on these costs. But this reduction in the strength of incentives cannot overturn the ranking because of this higher cost, because if the organization came to underperform 35 Ignoring the induced non-linearity of compensation even with linear incentive contracts.
an alternative structure as a result, then it would face a lower cost of providing incentives. Thus, while the di¤erences in the strength of incentives would be lower in equilibrium than under a corresponding setting but a structure-independent cost of incentives, the qualitative logic and trade-o¤s involved are not changed. The additional shortcoming of this approach is that, in the present model, there is no natural pro…t benchmark and the expected pro…ts are monotonically decreasing in the volatility of the environment. As a result, the e¤ective cost of incentives would be actually decreasing in volatility, further increasing the upward-trend in the strength of incentives relative to the formulations discussed below.
Risk-aversion:
The most traditional approach to the agency cost of incentives is through the risk-aversion of the agents. Much like with limited liability, explicitly introducing riskaversion to the model makes the analysis intractable, as it changes decision-making (imperfect information makes the division managers more cautious when responding to information), communication (risk-aversion should improve communication because the division managers become less adaptive to their own conditions) and information acquisition (riskaverse division managers will acquire more information to reduce uncertainty). There is, however, nothing in the nature of risk-aversion that would impact one governance structure disproportionately more than the other or change the qualitative nature of the basic tradeo¤s involved. Further, as ! 1; the two solutions continue to be equivalent because the equilibrium decisions continue to converge (perfect coordination).
Finally, using risk-aversion is the present setting is unattractive because it would need to ignore the matching of people with di¤erent risk preferences to di¤erent environments. Indeed, using the assumption of …xed risk preferences would lead to the counterintuitive result that when the environment becomes su¢ ciently volatile, the strength of incentives goes to zero because the cost of incentives becomes simply too high. 36 And introducing any variation in risk preferences would be fully arti…cial, with the exception of the natural assumption that less risk averse individuals have a relative advantage in working in more volatile environments.
In summary, while there are potentially interesting interactions that the presence of limited liability, ex ante budget constraints or risk-aversion could introduce to the analysis, there is nothing in the logic of either approach that would appear to have a …rst-order e¤ect on the qualitative trade-o¤s analyzed and the conclusions reached in the present paper. The analysis considered only a setting where the cost of incentives was proportional to volatility. To some extent, this assumption is without loss of generality, in the sense that one can consider any co-movement between volatility and the cost of incentives as a co-movement between volatility and the cost of information. To give one simple example, consider that, instead of being proportional to volatility, the cost of information would be independent of volatility, given by G ( ) =
: Now, as volatility increases, the relative cost of incentives decreases (value of incentives goes up while the cost stays constant). Therefore, relative to the results presented in the analysis, there is an additional upward trend to the strength of incentives. An example of this is given in …gure 8. Now, when the environment is very stable, information is not very valuable while incentives are costly. Therefore, the organization provides only weak incentives. And because the equilibrium quality of information is then low, no …rm-wide incentives are used. As volatility increases, the equilibrium degree of operational integration decreases and the relative cost of incentives goes down. As a result, the organization increases the strength of incentives signi…cantly and eventually the quality of information acquired becomes su¢ ciently high that …rm-wide incentives are also introduced to make better use of the information generated. Finally, as volatility increases further, the equilibrium degree of operational integration becomes su¢ ciently low so that the use of …rm-wide incentives again diminishes.
